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An Empirical Analysis of the Use of the Intent Test to Determine Parentage
in Assisted Reproductive Technology Cases
Abstract

States have been slow to adopt model acts regarding assisted reproductive technology (ART), or to draft ART
legislation of their own, leaving most parents of ART children without a clear path to obtain legal parentage.
As a result, when a child conceived via ART is born, the adults involved must turn to the courts to make a
determination as to legal parentage. These courts have used a variety of approaches to determine legal
parentage in ART cases, which along with the inherent discretion involved in judicial decisions absent clear
precedent or statute has led to unpredictable, and sometimes inequitable, findings regarding parentage of ART
children. This Article seeks to uncover what bases courts have used to determine parentage of ART children
and whether courts have, perhaps unwittingly, developed a consensus as to how to best determine parentage
of children conceived via ART.
This Article provides the results of a first-of-its-kind study of every case on Westlaw addressing parentage of
ART children. Each case was coded and analyzed based on what test the court used to determine legal
parentage of an ART child and what factors of each case were statistically significant in making that
determination. The empirical evidence demonstrates two facts: (1) courts have used five different tests to
determine parentage of ART children; and (2) regardless of the test used by the court, in over 74% of the
cases, the outcome of the case was the same as if the intent test had been used.
Part II of this Article describes the methodology of the study, including how the relevant cases were identified
and how those cases were coded and analyzed. Part III identifies the various tests courts have used to
determine parentage in ART cases. This Part also describes each test and provides examples of how courts
have applied each test. Finally, Part IV presents the data, noting which aspects of the cases were statistically
relevant to the courts' determinations and demonstrating courts' tendencies to vest legal parentage in the
intended parents, even if the court does not apply the intent test by name.
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INTRODUCTION

Twenty-four years ago, Professor Marjorie Shultz
introduced the intent test as a means to determine parentage
of children conceived via assisted reproductive technology
1
(ART). According to Professor Shultz, when a child is
conceived via ART, the person(s) that intended to bring the
child into the world and raise the child should be the child’s
2
legal parent(s). Only three years after the publication of
Professor Shultz’s article, the California Supreme Court
applied this “intent test” in Johnson v. Calvert.3 In Johnson,
both the surrogate that gestated the child and the woman that
provided the egg used to conceive the child claimed to be the
child’s legal mother.4 The court held that the genetic mother
was the legal mother because she was the woman who, when
the child was conceived, intended to raise the child.5 Since
then, every model act that has been drafted in the United
States to address issues that arise when children are conceived
via ART has incorporated the intent test to determine legal
parentage.6
Unfortunately, states have been slow to adopt these model
acts, or to draft ART legislation of their own, leaving most
parents of ART children without a clear path to obtain legal
parentage.7 As a result, when a child conceived via ART is
1. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 322–25.
2. Id. at 323 (“Within the context of artificial reproductive techniques, intentions
that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained-for ought presumptively to
determine legal parenthood.”).
3. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
4. Id. at 778.
5. Id. at 782 (“[A]lthough the [Uniform Parentage] Act recognizes both genetic
consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child relationship,
when the two means do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the
child—that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to
raise as her own—is the natural mother under California law.”).
6. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 703, 801, 807 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71,
77–78, 84 (Supp. 2012) (determining parentage based on intent when a child is conceived
via alternative insemination or when gestational surrogacy is used); MODEL ACT
GOVERNING
ASSISTED
REPROD.
TECH.
§§ 602−03
(2008),
available
at
http://apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf
(providing
model
legislative provisions that determine parentage based on intent when a child is conceived
via assisted reproduction); see also Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
47/15 (LexisNexis 2010) (determining parentage based on intent when gestational
surrogacy is used).
7. See Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 388 (2012) (noting that
while some states have adopted some form of ART legislation, approximately thirty
“states either have no statute or have statutes diverging significantly” from the model
statutes). When a child is conceived via sexual reproduction, the determination of legal
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born, the adults involved must turn to the courts to make a
determination as to legal parentage. These courts have used a
variety of approaches to determine legal parentage in ART
cases, which—along with the inherent discretion involved in
judicial decisions absent clear precedent or statute—has led to
unpredictable, and sometimes inequitable, findings regarding
parentage of ART children. This Article seeks to uncover what
bases courts have used to determine parentage of ART
children and whether courts have, perhaps unwittingly,
developed a consensus as to how to best determine parentage
of children conceived via ART.
This Article provides the results of a first-of-its-kind study
of every case on Westlaw addressing parentage of ART
children. Each case was coded and analyzed based on what
test the court used to determine legal parentage of an ART
child and what factors of each case were statistically
significant in making that determination. The empirical
evidence demonstrates two facts: (1) courts have used five
different tests to determine parentage of ART children;8 and
(2) regardless of the test used by the court, in over 74% of the
cases, the outcome of the case was the same as if the intent
test had been used.9
Part II of this Article describes the methodology of the
study, including how the relevant cases were identified and
how those cases were coded and analyzed. Part III identifies
the various tests courts have used to determine parentage in
ART cases. This Part also describes each test and provides
examples of how courts have applied each test. Finally, Part IV
presents the data, noting which aspects of the cases were
statistically relevant to the courts’ determinations and
parentage is relatively clear under state statutes. See Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni
Vainik Ives, Which Came First the Parent or the Child?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 305,
332−34 (2010) (“The current parentage system is founded on the assumption that the
genetic mother and father should be the legal parents of children conceived through
sexual reproduction.”). In every state, the genetic mother, as evidenced by giving
birth to the child, is the legal mother. Id. at 332–33; see also James G. Dwyer, A
Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision Making About Their
Relationships, 11 W M. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 859 & n.28 (2003) (supplying a
comprehensive list of state statutes that define the legal mother as the woman who
gave birth to the child). State statutes also seek to quickly identify the genetic father
as the legal father via a series of presumptions. See Byrn & Ives, supra, at 333–34.
With the use of ART, determining parentage is more complex because up to five
individuals can be directly involved in the creation and conception of a child: (1) the
sperm provider; (2) the egg provider; (3) the gestating mother; (4) the intended
mother; and (5) the intended coparent. Id. at 340 & n.174.
8.
See infra Table 1.
9.
See infra Table 7b and accompanying text.

Do Not Delete

1298

4/28/2013 10:03 AM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[50:5

demonstrating courts’ tendencies to vest legal parentage in the
intended parents, even if the court does not apply the intent
test by name.
II. METHODOLOGY—FIFTY-STATE CASE SURVEY
The purpose of this study was twofold. First, the study
sought to determine on what bases courts have decided ART
parentage cases. Second, the study considered whether the
results in ART parentage cases tended to favor the intended
parent(s). In addition, the study identified which factual
aspects of a case, if any, were statistically significant relative
to the determination of parentage. This Part describes the
methodology used throughout the study, including how the
data set was developed, how the cases were coded, and how the
data was analyzed.
A. The Data Set
The first step in this study was developing the Westlaw
search strategy to collect and compile the relevant cases. A
comprehensive search term was developed to be inclusive of all
methods of ART.10 This search term was entered into the
Westlaw search engine for all cases.11 The results of this search
formed the initial case record. The initial case record was
enlarged by performing a review of the cases citing and cited
by each case in the initial search. Additional relevant cases
were added to the record. To further develop the record, and in
an attempt to ensure that as many relevant cases as possible
were reviewed and included, a search of relevant Westlaw Key
Numbers was also performed.12
The cases in this record were then reviewed for relevance
to the study. Cases that determined a procedural issue that
was unrelated to a determination of parentage were removed
from the case record. For example, a case that determined
standing of an intended parent was included, whereas a case

10. The comprehensive search term was as follows: (“ASSIST! REPRODUCT!” IVF “IN
VITRO FERTILIZATION” “EGG DON!” “SPERM DON!” SURROGACY) & (PARENTAGE
“PARENTAL STATUS” “LEGAL PARENT” “NATURAL PARENT” “PARENT CHILD
RELATIONSHIP”) & (DETERMINE ESTABLISH) /P (INTENT! GENETIC! “BEST
INTEREST CHILD”).
11. One limitation on the number of cases included is simply that not all cases are
reported in Westlaw.
12. These included 289k20: Partnership, Creation of Relation in General; 76Hk15:
Children Out-of-Wedlock, Assisted Reproduction, Surrogate Parenting; and 76Dk274.5: Child
Custody, Assisted Reproduction, Surrogate Parenting.
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that was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction was not.13 The final
case record consisted of 208 cases.14 All 208 cases were then
coded according to the factors set forth below.
B. Coded Factors
In order to gain an understanding of the relationship
among certain factors in each case and the overarching
relationships and trends between the cases, the cases were
coded for important factors based on an empirical studies
15
approach known as “content analysis.” Each case was coded
for several factors, including the following16:
• State;
• Year decided;
• Method of ART used;
• Intended parents’ marital status;
• Intended parents’ sexual orientation;
• Approach used by the court to determine
parentage; and
• Whether the judicial decision result was the same
17
as the intent test.

13.
To determine if a case is relevant for this study, the case was reviewed to
ensure that the issue in the case was parentage of a child conceived by ART. Cases
that did not fit this description were not included, nor were cases that primarily
resolved issues related to the disposition or use of cryopreserved genetic tissue.
14.
The record was further limited only to the case opinion decided by the
highest court at the time of collection, October 22, 2012.
15.
Content analysis is a method of empirical study in which the researcher
collects a set of cases, systematically reviews them to record the material factors in
each opinion, and further reviews the collection for statistical meaning among such
factors. See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of
Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 64 (2008).
16.
Additional coded factors were (1) whether or not the parties in the
proceeding were adversarial; (2) which parties were asserting parentage;
(3) surrogate’s marital status (if applicable); (4) intended parents’ genetic and/or
gestational contribution to the ART process; (5) instrument used to demonstrate the
parties’ intentions; (6) initial action and main issue(s) to be decided by the court (the
issue is always relevant to the determination of parentage, but at times is phrased
differently; for example, in some cases the main issue to be decided was child
support, however, a determination of parentage was necessary first); (7) procedural
posture and holding; (8) statutes used, if any; (9) precedent used, if any; (10) action
by the court; (11) the name and gender of the judge; (12) dissenting opinion, if any;
(13) concurring opinion, if any; (14) if published; (15) Westlaw KeyCite designation;
and (16) Westlaw Key Number related to ART.
17.
Intent for purposes of this study was measured by the intent of the parties
prior to or contemporaneous with conception, generally recorded in some kind of
instrument or other evidence communicated at trial, for example, testimony
regarding conduct of the parties involved.
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These factors can be divided into two general categories:
(1) factual data—those coded factors that consist of factual
information provided by the court in its opinion such as the
year decided—and (2) substantive data—those coded factors
that required interpretation. The substantive data consists of
what approach the court used to determine parentage and
whether the result would have been the same had the intent
test been used. To ensure the record for the substantive data
was as accurate and replicable as possible, one person did all
of the coding. Any questions regarding coding were discussed
and resolved in regular meetings with the principal Author.
Particularly important was the coding for cases in which the
judge considered multiple tests to determine parentage. In
these cases, the substantive data was coded in favor of the test
the court considered to be the most determinative.18 Finally, all
of the coding discussed in this Article was checked by the
principal Author.
C. Statistical Analysis
The coded cases were then analyzed to determine the
factors that were significant in terms of the determination of
parentage. In Part IV, tables are provided that show the
significance of the type of ART used,19 the relationship status
of the parties using ART,20 and the jurisdictional location of the
21
court. In order to establish statistical significance, Chisquared tests were conducted. A Chi-squared test is used to
determine if there is a significant relationship between groups
22
of categorical variables.
In each Chi-squared test, we
assumed a null hypothesis of independence between the
variables in question. If a Chi-squared probability was less
than or equal to 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. In
other words, if the Chi-squared probability was less than or
equal to 0.05, it was concluded that a statistically significant
relationship existed between the row variable and column
variable. That is, the relationship between the variables was
not random. If the Chi-squared probability was greater than
0.05, it was concluded that there was no significant

18. This process of regular questioning and independent double-checking of the
record was performed to ensure that the coding was consistent and replicable so that
ultimately the results of this study are reliable.
19. See infra Table 4.
20. See infra Table 5.
21. See infra Table 6.
22. JOSEPH F. HEALEY, THE ESSENTIALS OF STATISTICS 264 (2d ed. 2010).
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relationship between the row variable and the column
variable.
III. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO DETERMINING PARENTAGE IN
ART CASES
In the 208 cases included in this study, judges used five
different tests to determine legal parentage of children
conceived via ART: (1) applying a state statute; (2) relying on
public policy; (3) determining what was in the best interests of
the child; (4) awarding parentage to the genetic parents; and
(5) awarding parentage to the adults that, at the time of
conception, intended to raise the child. Each of these
approaches is described below.
A. Determining Parentage by Applying a State Statute
The statutory approach bases a parentage determination
on legislation adopted in the state in which the case is
adjudicated. Many states, for example, have adopted ART
statutes to deal with parentage in the context of a
heterosexual, married couple who conceives a child via
alternative insemination.23 A majority of states, however, do
not
have
statutes
explicitly
addressing
parentage
determinations involving a large portion of ART cases that
come before the courts today such as cases involving in vitro
fertilization (IVF), surrogacy, known gamete donors, or samesex couples.24 In these cases, some judges have found ways to
determine legal parentage of children conceived via various
23. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 2007) (stating that upon consent, the
husband is treated as the legal father of a child conceived by his wife through alternative
insemination); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.243 (2011) (describing the relationship of a child
conceived from alternative insemination to the mother’s husband).
24. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Children of Assisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 899, 899–900, 918, 928–29 (2012); Marjorie M. Shultz, Taking Account of ARTs
in Determining Parenthood: A Troubling Dispute in California, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
77, 79, 86–87, 100 & nn.77−78 (2005) (noting that many states have adopted the 1973
Uniform Parentage Act, which does not address ART, and only a few states have adopted
new statutes, including the 2002 Uniform Parentage Act, that specifically address ART
issues); see also Linda S. Anderson, Adding Players to the Game: Parentage
Determinations When Assisted Reproductive Technology Is Used to Create Families, 62
ARK. L. REV. 29, 33–37 (2009) (discussing the legislative silence as to parentage
determinations of children born via ART, other than the marital paternity presumption
when alternative insemination is used); Darra L. Hofman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s
Maybe:” A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact,
35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449, 454−60 (2009) (discussing the lack of statutory authority
for parentage determinations in ART disputes, particularly where surrogacy is used, and
presenting a table of the status of surrogacy agreements in the states and the District of
Columbia).
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ART methods by applying statutes not originally intended for
that purpose. Courts have applied statutes in ART cases in
three different circumstances: (1) the court simply applies an
ART statute that is directly on point; (2) the court applies an
ART statute to a factual situation not contemplated by the
statute; or (3) the court applies a non-ART statute to an ART
situation.
The first variation of the statutory approach is
straightforward, with the court merely applying a statute
according to its terms.25 The most common ART statute deals
with alternative insemination.26 Most of these statutes
automatically vest the husband with legal parentage when his
wife conceives a child using alternative insemination, even if
the husband’s sperm was not used.27 A few states also have
clear legislation governing parentage determinations in ART
cases beyond alternative insemination.28 Illinois, for example,
has enacted a Gestational Surrogacy Act, which outlines the
requirements for establishing legal parentage in the intended
parents when a child is gestated by a surrogate.29 Although
under these more progressive ART statutes the persons vested
with legal parentage are the intended parents, for the
25. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 1991 WL 57753, at *1, *19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Jan. 18, 1991) (holding that a husband was not obligated to pay child support unless he
had consented, in writing, to the artificial insemination as was required under New York
domestic relations law).
26. See Byrn & Ives, supra note 7, at 340 n.177 (stating that two-thirds of the states
have alternative insemination statutes); Shultz, supra note 1, at 309 n.33, 372 (noting
that alternative insemination has existed for decades and many states have statutes
governing it).
27. Byrn & Ives, supra note 7, at 319; Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure
Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS
L.J. 597, 623 (2002); see, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 2007) (“If, under the
supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is
inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is
treated in law as if he were the biological father of a child thereby conceived.”).
28. E.g., Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15 (LexisNexis
2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (LexisNexis 2010) (naming the intended parents as
the legal parents of a child born via a gestational surrogate so long as they are married
and both are also the genetic parents of the child); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-08 (2009)
(declaring that the intended parents are the legal parents of a child born to a gestational
surrogate, and negating any potential parental status in the surrogate or her husband, if
any); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.756 (West 2008) (establishing legal parentage in the
intended parents when a gestational surrogacy agreement is validated by the court prior
to the start of the ART procedure).
29. Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15 (LexisNexis 2010).
A gestational surrogate is a woman not genetically related to the child “who carries out
the gestational function and gives birth to a child for another . . . and who relinquishes
any parental rights she may have upon the birth of the child.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1106 (9th ed. 2009); see also Helene S. Shapo, Assisted Reproduction and the Law:
Disharmony on a Divisive Social Issue, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 465, 477 (2006).

Do Not Delete

2013]

4/28/2013 10:03 AM

INTENT TEST IN ART CASES

1303

purposes of this study, if a court applied a state statute, the
case was coded as determining parentage by applying a state
statute.
The second variation of the statutory approach occurs
when a court applies an ART statute to a factual situation that
does not explicitly fit the text of the statute or the explicit
intent of the drafters of the statute. Although some states have
an alternative insemination statute, the language of these
statutes suggests that they apply in very limited
circumstances.30 A typical alternative insemination statute
provides that the husband is the legal father when he consents
in writing to the insemination of his wife, by a licensed
physician, using donated sperm.31 Despite the limiting
language of these statutes, courts have applied them beyond
situations that meet all of the factual requirements. These
statutes have been used to determine parentage of children
conceived via alternative insemination to single persons,32
33
same-sex couples, and parties that otherwise did not strictly
comply with the statutory requirements.34 For example, the
Oregon Court of Appeals used this variation of the statutory
approach when it expanded the application of its alternative
insemination statute.35 Although the language of its
alternative insemination statute is limited to a husband and
36
wife, the court extended the statute to include the same-sex

30. Byrn & Ives, supra note 7, at 340.
31. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.243 (2011);
see also Storrow, supra note 27, at 623–24 (stating that “[u]nder all statutes that define
the paternity ramifications of artificial insemination by donor, the husband of an
artificially inseminated woman is the father of the resulting child if he consented to the
insemination,” and noting that “[t]he typical method of demonstrating consent is through
a signed writing”).
32. E.g., In re Adoption of Michael, 636 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609 (Sur. Ct. 1996) (holding
that New York’s alternative insemination statute, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney
2010), which works to bar sperm donors from asserting any parental rights, applied to a
single woman, despite the statutory language referring only to married women).
33. E.g., In re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036, 1037–38, 1042 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 2005) (applying New Jersey’s alternative insemination statute, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:17-44 (West 2002), to a same-sex female couple, declaring both intended mothers as
legal parents, though only one woman was biologically related to the child conceived
through alternative insemination, they were not married, and the statutory language
referred only to “a wife” and “her husband”).
34. E.g., Lane v. Lane, 912 P.2d 290, 295–96 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (finding the
intended father who did not consent in writing to the alternative insemination of his wife
as required by New Mexico’s alternative insemination statute, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6
(2006) (repealed 2009), was nevertheless the legal father).
35. Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 39–40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
36. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.243 (2011).
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domestic partner of a woman who gave birth to a child
conceived via alternative insemination.37
In the third variation of the statutory approach, courts
apply non-ART statutes, such as second-parent adoption
statutes or paternity presumptions, beyond their explicit
38
legislative terms to determine parentage in an ART case. In
Elisa B. v. Superior Court, for example, the Supreme Court of
California used this statutory approach when it applied a
legislative paternity presumption in a gender-neutral
manner.39 In that case, Elisa disputed her obligation to support
twins born to her former same-sex partner on the basis that
she was not genetically related to the twins or otherwise
determined to be the twins’ legal mother.40 Applying a
paternity presumption included in the California Uniform
41
Parentage Act, the court held that Elisa was a legal parent
because she actively participated in causing the conception of
the children with the understanding that she would raise them
jointly with the birth mother, and she received the children
into her home and openly held them out as her own.42
Of the cases analyzed in this survey, 51.92% used the
43
statutory approach as the basis for the judicial decision. Over
63% of these cases would have had the same parentage
44
outcome had the intent test been used.
B. Determining Parentage Based on Public Policy
In states where no ART statutes exist and courts choose
not to apply statutes in unintended ways, some courts have
turned to public policy to determine parentage of ART
children.45 The public policy approach is different than the
37. Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 32, 39−40 (finding that the women otherwise complied
with the statutory requirements of consent and that the parties intended to coparent the
child).
38. E.g., Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272–76 (Vt. 1993) (applying
Vermont’s second-parent adoption statute to a same-sex couple, allowing for a joint
adoption without terminating the parental rights of the biological intended mother).
39. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 664–70 (Cal. 2005).
40. Id. at 663–64.
41. California Uniform Parentage Act, CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West Supp. 2013)
(presuming parentage when an individual “receives the child into his home and openly
holds out the child as his natural child”).
42. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 670.
43. See infra Table 1.
44. See infra Table 7b (excluding traditional surrogacy).
45. See T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1249–51 (Mass. 2004); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d
1227, 1234, 1246–47 (N.J. 1988) (“We invalidate the surrogacy contract because it
conflicts with the law and public policy of this State.”).
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statutory approach in that it is based on a general application
of statutory principles. The statutory approach identifies a
specific statute and applies its elements directly or by analogy
to the case at hand, whereas the public policy approach
identifies more general legislative principles and uses these
principles to determine parentage.46
The public policy approach was used in In re Baby M to
invalidate a traditional surrogacy agreement and establish
that the surrogate, not the intended mother, was the legal
mother of the child.47 There was not a statute directly on point
in the state of New Jersey and, rather than applying a nonART statute, the court concluded that the “surrogacy contract
is based on[ ] principles that are directly contrary to the
objectives of our laws.”48 The court reasoned that the public
policies underlying various state parentage statutes, including
policies against the separation of a child from its genetic
mother, prohibiting the payment of money in connection with
adoption, and preventing a child from being raised by both of
its “natural parents” prevented the court from enforcing the
surrogacy contract.49
The public policy approach was also used in Debra H. v.
Janice R., a case in which the court found that two women who
entered a civil union in Vermont were both parents of the child
50
born during the civil union. The couple separated when the
child was two years old, and the nonbiological mother sought
51
custody and visitation rights. The New York court found that,
as a matter of public policy, New York courts should recognize
parentage created by a Vermont civil union and declared both
52
women to be legal parents of the child.
Of the cases surveyed, 8.17% used public policy as the
53
basis of the judicial decision. Over 64% of these cases would
46. Compare In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240, 1246–47 (employing the public policy
approach by applying New Jersey’s “policies expressed in [its] comprehensive laws” to
evaluate a surrogacy agreement), with In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877, 878–79 (S.C. 1987)
(applying an ART statute to determine parentage in an alternative insemination case).
47. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234. A “traditional surrogacy contract” is one in
which the “surrogate agrees to be inseminated with . . . sperm, and to carry the pregnancy
to term.” Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, Reproductive Surrogacy at the
Millennium: Proposed Model Legislation Regulating “Non-Traditional” Gestational
Surrogacy Contracts, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 673, 675 (2000).
48. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240, 1246–47, 1250.
49. Id. at 1246–50.
50. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 196 (N.Y. 2010).
51. Id. at 186.
52. Id. at 196–97.
53. See infra Table 1.

Do Not Delete

1306

4/28/2013 10:03 AM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[50:5

have had the same parentage outcome had the intent test been
used.54
C. Determining Parentage Based on the Best Interests of the
Child
When determining legal parentage, the best interests of
the child (BIOC) approach relies on a case-by-case factual
inquiry into what is in the best interests of the child based on
certain factors. Though these factors are often codified in a
statute, the BIOC approach has been categorically
differentiated from the statutory approach for purposes of this
study due to its particular focus on a postbirth factual
investigation.
In Rubano v. DiCenzo, the BIOC approach was used to
resolve a case in which a woman petitioned for a declaration of
parentage with respect to the biological child of her former
55
same-sex domestic partner. The petitioner was deemed by the
court to be a de facto parent entitled to certain legal parental
rights, including visitation, because it was in the best interests
of the child.56 The court summarized its BIOC inquiry stating
that the biological mother could not “arbitrarily terminate” the
de facto parental relationship the intended mother had with
the child, a relationship that the biological mother intended to
57
create and “fostered for many years.”
Of the cases surveyed, 15.87% used the BIOC approach as
58
the basis of the judicial decision. Over 76% of these cases
would have had the same parentage outcome had the intent
test been used.59
D. Determining Parentage Based on Genetics
The genetic test determines legal parentage based on a
60
genetic relationship with the child. The court in Belsito v.
Clark articulated the genetic test when it analyzed the relative
parental rights of two intended parents who were also the
genetic parents, against the interests of a gestational
54. See infra Table 7b (excluding traditional surrogacy).
55. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 961–63, 976−77 (R.I. 2000). “Although
Rubano never adopted the child, for four years she lived together with DiCenzo and both
of them raised the boy as their son.” Id. at 961.
56. Id. at 975−76.
57. Id. at 976.
58. See infra Table 1.
59. See infra Table 7b (excluding traditional surrogacy).
60. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994).
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surrogate.61 According to the court, “[i]f the genetic providers
have not waived their rights and have decided to raise the
child, then they must be recognized as the natural and legal
62
parents.” Under this analysis, the act of giving birth, by a
gestational surrogate for example, is “subordinate and
secondary to genetics.”63 In Belsito, therefore, the two genetic
64
providers were declared the child’s legal parents.
Of the cases surveyed, only 3.37% used genetics as the
65
basis of the judicial decision. Over 83% of these cases would
have had the same parentage outcome had the intent test been
used.66
E. Determining Parentage Based on Intent
The intent test vests legal parentage in the party or
parties that affirmatively intended to conceive and raise a
child, and “[b]ut for their acted-on intention, the child would
67
not exist.” The persons who intended to conceive and raise
the child are held responsible for the care and support of that
child, even if they later attempt to avoid such responsibility,68
thereby avoiding a situation in which a child could be found to
69
have no legal parents or an unwitting donor or surrogate
could be found legally responsible for the child.
In Johnson v. Calvert, the landmark case that articulated
the intent test, the court determined legal maternity as
70
between the intended mother and the gestational carrier.
71
Both women wanted to be declared the legal mother. Both
women also had a legally recognized maternal relationship

61. Id. at 761−64.
62. Id. at 767.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See infra Table 1.
66. See infra Table 7b (excluding traditional surrogacy).
67. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
68. See Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 604–05 (Ind. 2004) (determining that a man
who consented to insemination of his former wife during their marriage was the legal
father of the child that resulted from insemination and, therefore, was responsible for
paying child support).
69. See, e.g., Buzzanca v. Buzzanca (In re Marriage of Buzzanca), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d
280, 282, 293−94 (Ct. App. 1998) (reversing the lower court’s declaration that the child
born to a gestational surrogate, and conceived using anonymously donated sperm and
ova, had no legal parents; finding instead that the intended parents are the legal
parents).
70. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778, 782; see also PHYLLIS CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL:
THE BATTLE FOR CHILDREN AND CUSTODY 341 (2d ed., rev. & updated 2011).
71. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
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with the child—the intended mother as the genetic mother and
the gestational carrier as the birth mother.72 To break this
maternity “tie,” the court looked to the parties’ intent at the
73
outset of the arrangement. The court ultimately declared that
the intended mother was the legal mother, saying “[the
woman] who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended
to raise as her own—is the natural mother.”74 Since Johnson
was decided in 1993, courts have continued to use and broaden
the scope of the intent test. For instance, in 1994, a New York
court applied the intent test and determined that an intended
mother was a legal parent when she had no genetic
relationship with the child but had intended to bring the child
into the world and raise the child.75 More recently, the intent
test has been applied in a series of cases in Connecticut to
recognize legal parentage of the intended parent(s) in both
same-sex and opposite-sex couples that used gestational
surrogacy, even if the intended parent(s) had no genetic
relationship to the child.76
Of the cases surveyed, 20.67% used the intent test as the
77
basis of the judicial decision.

72. Id. at 781−82.
73. Id. at 782.
74. Id.
75. McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480−81 (App. Div. 1994).
76. See Goad v. Arel, No. FA074025574, 2007 WL 4711515, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct.
May 24, 2007); Wray v. Samuel, No. FA074024921, 2007 WL 4711519, at *1 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Apr. 20, 2007); Caliendo v. Mariano, No. FA074023465S, 2007 WL 4711520, at *1
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2007); Caird v. Lugo, No. FA064017776, 2006 WL 5242383, at *1
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2006); DiComo v. Hopkins, No. FA054007885S, 2005 WL
6007836, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2005); Velardo v. Murray, No. 485648, 2004 WL
5506691, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2004); Friend v. Lugo, No. CV020467901, 2002
WL 34370247, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2002); Hatzopoulos v. Murray, No.
FA020460329S, 2002 WL 34370245, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2002); Vogle v.
Kirkbride, No. FA 02-0471850, 2002 WL 34119315, *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002).
Compare Griffiths v. Taylor, No. FA084015629, 2008 WL 2745130, at *1, *3, *5 (Conn.
Super. Ct. June 13, 2008) (using a statutory approach, the court came to the same
conclusion had the intent test been used, finding the two intended fathers that used a
gestational surrogate were legal parents of that child), with Oleski v. Hynes, No.
KNLFA084008415, 2008 WL 2930518, at *3, *5, *8, *11, *18–19 (Conn. Super. Ct. July
10, 2008) (using a statutory approach, the court came to a different result than had the
intent test been used, finding that only the intended father with a genetic relationship
was the legal father of the children born via a gestational surrogate, and that the other
intended father was not entitled under Connecticut law to be named as the children’s
parent on their birth certificates).
77. See infra Table 1.
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IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Using the Chi-squared test, the coded factors for each case
were analyzed. Three of the coded factors proved to be
statistically significant: (1) the type of ART used; (2) the
relationship status of the parties using ART; and (3) the
78
jurisdictional location of the court. Each of the factors was
analyzed in relation to the approach used by the court to
determine parentage. The results of this statistical analysis
are below.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics about the bases for
judicial decisions in cases that analyzed parentage of ART
children. Results are examined both before and after 1993, the
year in which the California Supreme Court decided Johnson
79
80
v. Calvert, the landmark intent test case mentioned supra.
With N representing the number of cases in our sample that
fall under the specified condition, of the 208 cases in the study,
in 108 cases (51.92%) the judge relied on a statute to make her
decision, 17 (8.17%) were based on public policy, 33 (15.87%)
were decided based on BIOC, 7 (3.37%) were decided based on
genetics, and 43 (20.67%) were based on intent.
Table 1. Basis for Judicial Decision, Pre- and Post-1993
Entire Sample
(N = 208)

Pre-1993
(N = 36)

Post-1993
(N=172)

Statute

N = 108
(51.92%)

N = 22
(61.11%)

N = 86
(50.00%)

Public Policy

N = 17
(8.17%)

N=4
(11.11%)

N = 13
(7.56%)

BIOC

N = 33
(15.87%)

N=7
(19.44%)

N = 26
(15.12%)

Genetics

N=7
(3.37%)

N=0
(0.00%)

N=7
(4.07%)

Basis for Judicial Decision

N = 43
N=3
N = 40
Intent
(20.67%)
(8.33%)
(23.26%)
Source: Authors’ data and calculations.
N is the number of cases in our sample that fall under the specified condition.

78.
79.
80.

See infra Table 2.
Johnson, 851 P.2d at 776.
See supra text accompanying notes 70–74.
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Table 2 explores factors that had a statistically significant
impact on judicial decisions in ART cases, including the type of
ART used, the relationship status of the parties using ART,
and the jurisdictional location of the court (identified by
circuit).
The majority of the 208 cases examined involved
alternative insemination (60.10%). Ninety-four (45.19%) of the
cases involved lesbian couples. The cases occurred in all twelve
circuits, with the most cases (fifty-six) occurring in the Second
Circuit. The cases were coded by state, but the sample sizes by
state were too small to analyze statistically. The state cases
were grouped by circuit for the Chi-squared tests.
Table 2. Factors Potentially Influencing Judicial
Decisions, Pre- and Post-1993
Entire Sample
(N = 208)

Pre-1993
(N = 36)

Post-1993
(N=172)

N = 125
(60.10%)
N = 23
(11.54%)
N = 46
(21.74%)
N = 14
(6.73%)

N = 27
(75.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=2
(5.56%)
N=7
(19.4%)

N = 98
(56.98%)
N = 23
(13.95%)
N = 44
(25.15%)
N=7
(4.30%)

N = 76
(36.54%)
N = 13
(6.25%)
N = 94
(45.19%)
N = 10
(4.81%)
N = 12
(5.77%)
N=3
(1.44%)

N = 25
(69.44%)
N=1
(2.78%)
N=8
(22.20%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=2
(5.56%)
N=0
(0.00%)

N = 51
(29.65%)
N = 12
(6.98%)
N = 86
(50.00%)
N = 10
(5.81%)
N = 10
(5.81%)
N=3
(1.44%)

Type of ART
Alternative Insemination
In Vitro Fertilization
Gestational Surrogacy
Traditional Surrogacy
Relationship Status
Married Heterosexual
Couples
Unmarried Heterosexual
Couples
Lesbian Couples
Gay Male Couples
Single Female
Single Male
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Circuit Court
N = 14
(6.73%)
N = 56
Second82
(27.92%)
N = 23
Third83
(11.06%)
N = 12
Fourth84
(5.77%)
N = 11
Fifth85
(5.29%)
N = 23
Sixth86
(11.06%)
N = 13
Seventh87
(6.25%)
N=6
Eighth88
(2.88%)
N = 33
Ninth89
(15.87%)
N = 10
Tenth90
(4.81%)
N=6
Eleventh91
(2.88%)
N=1
District of Columbia92
(0.48%)
Source: Authors’ data and calculations.
First81

N=0
(0.00%)
N = 14
(38.89%)
N=3
(8.33%)
N=3
(8.33%)
N=1
(2.78%)
N=3
(8.33%)
N=2
(5.56%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=6
(16.67%)
N=3
(8.33%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=1
(2.78%)

N = 14
(8.14%)
N = 42
(24.42%)
N = 20
(11.63%)
N=9
(5.23%)
N = 10
(5.81%)
N = 20
(11.63%)
N = 11
(6.40%)
N=6
(3.49%)
N = 27
(15.70%)
N=7
(4.07%)
N=6
(3.49%)
N=0
(0.00%)

Table 3 provides descriptive information on the type of
ART compared to the relationship status of the persons using
81. The First Circuit includes the following states (with the number of cases in each
state in parentheses): Maine (three), Massachusetts (eleven), New Hampshire (zero),
Puerto Rico (zero), and Rhode Island (one).
82. The Second Circuit includes the following states: Connecticut (twenty-four),
New York (thirty-five), and Vermont (two).
83. The Third Circuit includes the following states and territory: Delaware (two),
New Jersey (twelve), Pennsylvania (eleven), and the Virgin Islands (zero).
84. The Fourth Circuit includes the following states: Maryland (two), North
Carolina (five), South Carolina (one), Virginia (four), and West Virginia (zero).
85. The Fifth Circuit includes the following states: District of the Canal Zone (zero),
Louisiana (two), Mississippi (zero), and Texas (nine).
86. The Sixth Circuit includes the following states: Kentucky (three), Michigan
(one), Ohio (eighteen), and Tennessee (two).
87. The Seventh Circuit includes the following states: Illinois (six), Indiana (five),
and Wisconsin (two).
88. The Eighth Circuit includes the following states: Arkansas (two), Iowa (zero),
Minnesota (three), Missouri (one), Nebraska (one), North Dakota (zero), and South
Dakota (zero).
89. The Ninth Circuit includes the following states and territory: Alaska (zero),
Arizona (three), California (twenty-four), Guam (zero), Hawaii (zero), Idaho (zero),
Montana (zero), Nevada (zero), Oregon (four), and Washington (three).
90. The Tenth Circuit includes the following states: Colorado (three), Kansas (two),
New Mexico (three), Oklahoma (zero), Utah (two), and Wyoming (zero).
91. The Eleventh Circuit includes the following states: Alabama (one), Florida (six),
and Georgia (one).
92. The District of Columbia Circuit includes the District of Columbia (one).
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ART. In the 208 ART cases published on Westlaw, married
heterosexual couples relied primarily on gestational surrogacy
(40.79%), unmarried heterosexual couples relied mostly on
alternative insemination (53.85%), lesbian couples relied
primarily on alternative insemination (88.30%), and single
females relied mostly on alternative insemination (75.00%).
Understandably, both gay male couples and single males relied
exclusively on surrogacy (100.00%).
Chi-squared tests for significance were added to the rows
and columns of Table 3. Significance is denoted by an asterisk
(*) in the cell. Reading from left to right, looking at the
Significance Test column, the Chi-squared test establishes if,
for example, in the 208 cases examined, married heterosexual
couples are equally likely to use alternative insemination, IVF,
gestational surrogacy, or traditional surrogacy, or if there is a
significant relationship between relationship status and the
type of ART used. The Chi-squared value for the first row is
significant, indicating that in court cases involving married
heterosexual couples, the type of ART is not random. These
couples are most likely to use gestational surrogacy and
alternative insemination. Also in the 208 cases examined, the
type of ART used by lesbian couples and gay male couples is
statistically significant.
Reading from top to bottom, the significance tests in the
bottom row provide information on the likelihood that, for
example, in the 208 court cases determining parentage, using
alternative insemination is equally likely across all
relationship statuses. The Chi-squared test in the first column
is significant, indicating that there is a significant relationship
between alternative insemination and relationship status.
Alternative insemination is most likely to be used by lesbian
couples and married heterosexual couples. Columns three and
four are also significant, indicating that gestational and
traditional surrogacy does not occur randomly across
relationship statuses.
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Table 3. Type of Assisted Reproductive Technology Used
by Each Relationship Status

Relationship
Status
Married
Heterosexual
Couples
Unmarried
Heterosexual
Couples
Lesbian
Couples
Gay Male
Couples
Single Female
Single Male
Significance
Test

Type of ART†
AI
IVF
(N = 125)
(N = 23)

GS
(N = 46)

TS
(N = 14)

N = 26
(34.21%)

N=6
(7.89%)

N = 31
(40.79%)

N = 13
(17.11%)

N=7
(53.85%)
N = 83
(88.30%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=9
(75.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
X2 = 73.31
Pr = 0.00*

N=4
(30.77%)
N = 11
(11.70%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=2
(16.67%)
N=0
(0.00%)
X2 = 6.42
Pr = 0.27

N=2
(15.38%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=9
(90.00%)
N=1
(8.33%)
N=3
(100.0%)
X2 = 74.37
Pr = 0.00*

N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=1
(10.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
X2 = 22.00
Pr = 0.00*

Total

Significance
Test

N = 76

X2 = 54.19
Pr = 0.00*

N = 13
N = 94
N = 10
N = 12
N=3

X2 = 5.78
Pr = 0.13
X2 = 71.35
Pr = 0.00*
X2 = 23.04
Pr = 0.00*
X2 = 2.66
Pr = 0.45
X2 = 11.03
Pr = 0.01

Source: Authors’ data and calculations.
Note: * indicates significance at the 0.05 level or below.
†
Type of ART:
AI = Alternative Insemination
IVF = In Vitro Fertilization
GS = Gestational Surrogacy
TS = Traditional Surrogacy

Table 4 provides descriptive information on the basis of the
judge’s decision compared to the type of ART used. Regardless of
the type of ART used, judges relied primarily on statutes and intent
in making their parentage decisions. In the 208 cases examined,
judges in alternative insemination cases relied on statutes in
59.20% of the cases and intent in 12.80% of the cases. In IVF cases,
judges relied on statutes in 45.83% of the cases and intent in
29.17% of the cases. In gestational surrogacy cases, judges relied on
statutes and intent nearly equally, using statute in nearly 40% of
the cases and intent in nearly 45% of the cases. In traditional
surrogacy cases, judges relied on statutes in 50.00% of the cases and
intent in none of the cases.
Chi-squared tests for significance were added to the rows and
columns of Table 4. The results presented in the last column of
Table 4 show that in the 208 cases examined, there is a statistically
significant relationship between alternative insemination and the
basis on which the judge made her decision. The same can be said of
gestational surrogacy. There is not, however, a significant
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relationship between IVF or traditional surrogacy and the basis of
the judge’s decision. In cases involving alternative insemination,
judges are more likely to rely on statutes and BIOC when making
parentage decisions than on genetics, intent, or public policy.
The results in the last row of Table 4 indicate that in the 208
cases examined, statute, BIOC, genetics, and intent are all bases for
judicial decisions that are not independent of the type of ART
involved. That is, there is a statistically significant relationship
between the approach used by the judge and the type of ART
involved in the case. In the relatively small number of cases that
used public policy to determine parentage, however, the data does
not show any significant relationship between that approach and
the type of ART used.
Table 4. Effect of Reproductive Technology on
Judicial Decision
Basis of Judicial Decision
Statute
(N = 108)

Public
Policy
(N = 17)

BIOC
(N = 33)

Genetics
(N = 7)

Intent
(N = 43)

N = 74
(59.20%)
N = 10
(45.83%)
N = 17
(38.56%)
N=7
(50.00%)
X2 = 7.86
Pr = 0.05*

N = 10
(8.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=4
(8.89%)
N=3
(21.43%)
X2 = 5.45
Pr = 0.14

N = 24
(19.20%)
N=6
(25.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=3
(21.43%)
X2 = 11.35
Pr = 0.01*

N=1
(0.80%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=5
(11.11%)
N=1
(7.14%)
X2 = 12.28
Pr = 0.01*

N = 16
(12.80%)
N=7
(29.17%)
N = 20
(44.44%)
N=0
(0.00%)
X2 = 24.94
Pr = 0.00*

Total

Sig. Test

Type of
ART†
AI
IVF
GS
TS
Sig.
Test

N = 125
N = 23
N = 46
N = 14

X2 = 20.92
Pr = 0.00*
X2 = 5.70
Pr = 0.22
X2 = 37.76
Pr = 0.00*
X2 = 7.27
Pr = 0.12

Source: Authors’ data and calculations.
Note: * indicates significance at the 0.05 level.
†
Types of ART:
AI = Alternative Insemination
IVF = In Vitro Fertilization
GS = Gestational Surrogacy
TS = Traditional Surrogacy

Table 5 reports results from an analysis of whether the
relationship status factor influenced judicial decisions. Similar
to the data presented in Table 4, regardless of the relationship
status of the intended parents, judges most often relied on
statutes in making their parentage decisions.
Here we performed similar Chi-squared tests to examine
the relationship between the basis of judicial decisions and the
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relationship status of the persons using ART. The results are
presented in the last column and the last row in Table 5. The
relationship status matters significantly when it comes to
what test the judge used to determine parentage. Looking at
the last column, the Chi-squared tests show that judges are
not equally likely to apply all five tests with married
heterosexual couples, lesbian couples, and single males. On the
other hand, for unmarried heterosexual couples, gay couples,
and single persons, there was no significant relationship
between relationship status and the test used. Looking at the
bottom row, the Chi-squared tests in the public policy, BIOC,
and genetics columns show that judges are not equally likely
to apply their decisions across all couple types.
Table 5. Effect of Relationship Status on Basis of
Judicial Decision

Relationship
Status
Married
Heterosexual
Couples
Unmarried
Heterosexual
Couples
Lesbian
Couples
Gay Male
Couples
Single Female
Single Male
Significance
Test

Basis of Judicial Decision
Public
Statute
Policy
(N = 108)
(N = 17)

BIOC
(N = 33)

Genetics
(N = 7)

Intent
(N = 43)

N = 35
(46.05%)

N=6
(7.89%)

N=6
(7.89%)

N=7
(9.21%)

N = 22
(28.95%)

N=9
(69.23%)
N = 46
(48.94%)
N=8
(80.00%)
N=9
(75.00%)
N=1
(33.33%)
X2 = 9.08
Pr = 0.11

N=1
(7.69%)
N=8
(8.51%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=2
(66.67%)
X2 = 15.66
Pr = 0.01*

N=1
(7.69%)
N = 26
(27.66%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
X2 = 18.78
Pr = 0.00*

N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
X2 = 12.58
Pr = 0.03*

N=2
(15.38%)
N = 14
(14.89%)
N=2
(20.00%)
N=3
(25.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
X2 = 6.23
Pr = 0.28

Total

Significance
Test

N = 76

X2 = 21.73
Pr = 0.00*

N = 13
N = 94
N = 10
N = 12
N=3

X2 = 2.04
Pr = 0.73
X2 = 23.90
Pr = 0.00*
X2 = 4.48
Pr = 0.35
X2 = 4.91
Pr = 0.30
X2 = 14.16
Pr = 0.00*

Source: Authors’ data and calculations.
Note: * indicates significance at the .05 level.

Table 6 provides the results from Chi-squared tests that
examined the relationship between the jurisdictional location of
the court and the basis of the judge’s decision. The data reveals
that jurisdictional location is not consistently related to the test
used. Of the 208 cases examined, only courts located in the First,
Third, and Fifth Circuits showed a statistically significant
relationship to the basis of the judge’s decision. All of the other
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circuits are nearly significant in terms of the basis of the judicial
decision.
Table 6. Effect of Location of Court on Basis of
Judicial Decision
Basis of Judge’s Decision
Public
Statute
Policy
BIOC
(N = 108)
(N = 17)
(N = 33)

Genetics
(N = 7)

Intent
(N = 43)

N=1
(7.14%)
N=2
(3.57%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=1
(4.35%)
N=1
(7.69%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=1
(3.03%)
N=1
(10.0%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)

N=3
(21.43%)
N = 16
(28.57%)
N=7
(30.43%)
N=5
(41.67%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=3
(13.04%)
N=2
(15.38%)
N=1
(16.67%)
N=4
(12.12%)
N=1
(10.0%)
N=1
(16.67%)
N=0
(0.00%)

Total

Significance
Test

Circuit Court
N=2
N=2
N=6
(14.29%)
(14.29%)
(42.86%)
N = 27
N=4
N=7
Second
(48.21%)
(7.14%)
(12.50%)
N=5
N=4
N=7
Third
(21.74%)
(17.39%)
(30.43%)
N=5
N=1
N=1
Fourth
(41.67%)
(8.33%)
(8.33%)
N = 11
N=0
N=0
Fifth
(100.0%)
(0.00%)
(0.00%)
N = 12
N=3
N=4
Sixth
(52.17%)
(13.04%)
(17.39%)
N=8
N=0
N=2
Seventh
(61.54%)
(0.00%)
(15.38%)
N=3
N=1
N=1
Eight
(50.00%)
(16.67%)
(16.67%)
N = 24
N=1
N=3
Ninth
(72.73%)
(3.03%)
(9.09%)
N=6
N=1
N=1
Tenth
(60.00%)
(10.00%)
(10.00%)
N=5
N=0
N=0
Eleventh
(83.33%)
(0.00%)
(0.00%)
District of
N=0
N=0
N=1
Columbia
(0.00%)
(0.00%)
(100%)
Source: Authors’ data and calculations.
Note: * indicates significance at the 0.05 level.
First

N = 14
N = 56
N = 23
N = 12
N = 11
N = 23
N = 13
N=6
N = 33
N = 10
N=6
N=1

X2 = 12.32
Pr = 0.01*
X2 = 3.17
Pr = 0.53
X2 = 12.75
Pr = 0.01*
X2 = 3.86
Pr = 0.43
X2 = 10.75
Pr = 0.03*
X2 = 1.59
Pr = 0.81
X2 = 2.34
Pr = 0.67
X2 = 0.81
Pr = 0.93
X2 = 7.07
Pr = 0.13
X2 = 2.36
Pr = 0.67
X2 = 2.92
Pr = 0.57
X2 = 5.33
Pr = 0.26

The next five tables look specifically at the results of each case
to determine the likelihood of the intended parents being declared
the legal parents in any given case. As such, the remaining tables
reflect a data set of 165 cases. This set of 165 cases includes all of
the cases from the original 208 cases, less the 43 cases in which the
court explicitly applied the intent test.
When coding the cases, we included a factor that indicates
whether the outcome of the case is the same as if the judge had
relied on the intent test in making her decision. This factor is also
referred to as “results same”. Table 7a reports the results from the
analysis of the “results same” factor. Of the 165 cases decided on a
basis other than intent, 106 had the same result. This indicates
that—regardless of the stated test used—in 64.24% of cases decided
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on a basis other than intent, the outcome nonetheless favored the
intended parent(s). This is in addition to the 43 cases in which the
intent test was applied. As a result, in 71.63% of the 208 cases in
this study, the outcome of the case favored the intended parent(s).
Table 7a also reports results from a Chi-squared test that
examined the relationship between the basis of the judicial decision
and results same. Here the data shows no statistically significant
relationship between the basis of the decision and whether the
outcome of the case was the same as if the intent test had been
used. This lack of statistical significance is, in fact, significant. This
shows that judges are not biased toward the outcome being in favor
or against the intended parents in any given type of case.
Table 7a. Judicial Decision Result Is the Same as the
Intent Test

Basis of Judicial Decision
Statute
(N= 108)
Public Policy
(N = 17)
BIOC
(N = 33)
Genetics
(N = 7)
Total
(N = 165)

Judicial Decision Result Is the
Same as the Intent Test
Percent
N = 65

60.19%

N = 10

58.82%

N = 26

78.79%

N=5

71.43%

N = 106

64.24%
2

Significance Test
Source: Authors’ data and calculations.

X = 4.19
Pr = 0.24

Table 7b represents the same analysis as in Table 7a, with
traditional surrogacy cases removed from the data set. Traditional
surrogacy is not only extremely rare, but many argue that there are
perhaps valid reasons why the intent test should not apply to
93
traditional surrogacy in the same way as other types of ART. Table
7b removes the variable of traditional surrogacy and recalculates
the results same outcome compared to the basis of the judicial
decision. Table 7b shows that—regardless of the stated test used—
93. See Brittnay M. McMahon, The Science Behind Surrogacy: Why New York
Should Rethink Its Surrogacy Contracts Laws, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 359, 373 (2011);
see also supra Table 2 (illustrating that traditional surrogacy accounts for only 6.73% of
all ART procedures examined in the study).
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in over 66% of cases decided on a basis other than intent and not
including traditional surrogacy, the intended parents were
nonetheless determined to be the legal parents. This is in addition
to the 43 cases that applied the intent test. As a result, in 74.23% of
the cases in this study, excluding the traditional surrogacy cases,
the outcome of the case favored the intended parent(s).
Also, like in Table 7a, the Chi-squared test shows no
statistically significant relationship between the approach used by
the judge and whether the outcome favored the intended parents. In
other words, judges were equally comfortable with an outcome
favoring the intended parents regardless of the approach used.
Table 7b. Judicial Decision Result Is the Same as the
Intent Test Not Including Traditional Surrogacy

Basis of Judicial Decision
Statute
(N=101)
Public Policy
(N = 14)
BIOC
(N = 30)
Genetics
(N = 6)
Total
(N = 151)

Judicial Decision Result Is the
Same as the Intent Test
Percent
N = 64

63.37%

N=9

64.29%

N = 23

76.67%

N=5

83.33%

N = 101

66.89%
2
X = 4.21
Pr = 0.24

Significance Test
Source: Authors’ data and calculations.

Table 8 reports four key pieces of information. First, it shows
how many cases came out the same as intent, considering both the
type of ART and the judicial test used. For example, in alternative
insemination cases in which the judge used a statute to decide the
case, forty-four (59.46%) cases came out the same as had the intent
test been used.94 Second, Table 8 reports the total number of cases
that came out the same as if the intent test had been used per type
of ART. For example, looking at the Total column, seventy (64.22%)
alternative insemination cases came out the same as had the intent
test been used.95 Third, Table 8 reports results from a Chi-squared
94. AI–Statute–Results Same Cases from Table 8 (44) / AI–Statute Cases from
Table 4 (74) = 59.46%.
95. AI–Results Same Cases from Table 8 (70) / (Total AI Cases (125) – AI–Intent
Cases (16) from Table 4) = 64.22%.
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test that examined the relationship between the results same
outcome and the type of ART used. Looking at the Significance Test
column, we can reject the null hypothesis with regards to
alternative insemination, gestational surrogacy, and traditional
surrogacy and confidently say that results same is related to the
type of ART used. Fourth, Table 8 reports results from a Chisquared test that examined the relationship between results same
and basis of judicial decision. Looking at the Significance Test row,
we can reject the null hypothesis with regards to statute and
genetics and confidently say that these two bases of judicial
decisions are significantly related to whether the outcome of the
case will be that same as the intent test.
Table 8. Judicial Decision Result Is the Same as the Intent
Test by Type of ART and Basis of Judicial Decision
Basis of Judicial Decision Is the Same as the Intent Test
Public
Statute
Policy
BIOC
Genetics
Total

Significance
Test

Type of
ART†
AI
IVF
GS
TS
Total
Significance
Test

N = 44
(59.46%)
N=7
(70.00%)
N = 13
(76.47%)
N=1
(14.29%)
N = 65
(60.19%)
X2 = 7.34
Pr = 0.06*

N=6
(60.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=3
(75.00%)
N=1
(33.00%)
N = 10
(58.82%)
X2 = 2.73
Pr = 0.44

N = 19
(79.17%)
N=4
(66.67%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=3
(100.00%)
N = 26
(78.79%)
X2 = 6.02
Pr = 0.11

N=1
(100.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=4
(80.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=5
(71.43%)
X2 = 116.39
Pr = 0.00*

N = 70
(64.22%)
N = 11
(68.75%)
N = 20
(76.92%)
N=5
(35.71%)
N = 106
(64.24%)

2
= 5.85
Pr = 0.12*
2
= 3.30
Pr = 0.34
2
= 18.36
Pr = 0.00*
2
= 6.44
Pr = 0.09*

Source: Authors’ data and calculations.
Note: * indicates significance at the 0.05 level.
Note: this table excludes cases in which the judge applied the intent test.
†
Types of ART:
AI = Alternative Insemination
IVF = In Vitro Fertilization
GS = Gestational Surrogacy
TS = Traditional Surrogacy

Table 9 also reports four key pieces of information. First,
it shows how many cases came out the same as intent,
considering both relationship status and judicial test used. For
example, in cases with married heterosexual couples in which
the judge used a statute to decide the case, twenty-five
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(71.43%) cases came out the same as had the intent test been
96
used. Second, Table 9 reports the total number of cases that
came out the same as if the intent test had been used per
relationship status. For example, looking at the total column,
forty (74.07%) cases involving married heterosexual couples
97
came out the same as had the intent test been used. Third,
Table 9 reports results from a Chi-squared test that examined
the relationship between results same and relationship status.
Looking at the Significance Test column, we can reject the null
hypothesis with regards to married heterosexual couples,
lesbian couples, and single males and confidently say that
relationship status is significantly related to judicial decisions
that had the same outcome as the intent test. Cases involving
married heterosexual couples, lesbian couples, and single
males are most likely to result in a parentage determination
that is the same as had the judge relied on the intent test.
Fourth, Table 9 reports results from a Chi-squared test that
examined the relationship between results same and basis of
judicial decision. Looking at the Significance Test row, we can
reject the null hypothesis with regards to statute, public
policy, BIOC, and genetics and confidently say that all four
bases of the judicial decision are significantly related to
whether the outcome will be the same as the intent test.

96. MHC–Statute–Results Same Cases from Table 9 (25) / MHC–Statute Cases
from Table 5 (35) = 71.43%.
97. MHC–Results Same Cases from Table 9 (40) / (Total MHC Cases (76) – MHC–
Intent Cases (22) from Table 5) = 74.07%.
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Table 9. Judicial Decision Result Is the Same as the
Intent Test by Relationship Status and Basis of
Judicial Decision
Basis of Judicial Decision Is the Same as the Intent Test
Public
Statute

Policy

BIOC

Genetics

Total

Significance
Test

N = 25
(71.43%)

N=4
(66.67%)

N=6
(100%)

N=5
(71.43%)

N = 40
(74.07%)

= 9.22
Pr = 0.03*

N=0
(0.00%)
N=4
(50.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=2
(100%)
N = 10
(58.82%)

N=0
(0.00%)
N = 20
(76.92%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N = 26
(78.79%)

N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=5
(71.43%)

N=7
(63.64%)
N = 42
(52.50%)
N=6
(75.00%)
N=8
(88.89%)
N=3
(100.00%)
N = 106
(64.24%)

= 3.86
Pr = 0.28
2
= 28.31
Pr = 0.00*
2
= 3.27
Pr = 0.35
2
= 5.46
Pr =0.14
2
= 12.02
Pr = 0.00*

Total

N=7
(77.78%)
N = 18
(39.13%)
N=6
(75.00%)
N=8
(88.89%)
N=1
(100.00%)
N = 65
(60.19%)

Significance Test

2
= 26.88
Pr =0.00*

2
= 21.49
Pr = 0.00*

2
= 11.83
Pr = 0.04*

2
= 15.60
Pr = 0.06*

Relationship
Status
Married
Heterosexual
Couples
Unmarried
Heterosexual
Couples
Lesbian
Couples
Gay Male
Couples
Single Female
Single Male

Source: Authors’ data and calculations.
Note: * indicates significance at the 0.05 level.
Note: this table excludes cases in which the judge applied the intent test.

2

2
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Table 10 also reports four key pieces of information. First,
it shows how many cases came out the same as intent,
considering both jurisdictional location (by circuit court) and
judicial test used. For example, in Second Circuit cases in
which the judge used a statute to decide the case, sixteen
(59.26%) cases came out the same as had the intent test been
98
used Table 10 also reports the total number of results same
cases per circuit. For example, looking at the Total column,
twenty-seven (67.50%) Second Circuit cases came out the same
99
as had the intent test been used. Third, Table 10 reports
results from a Chi-squared test that examined the relationship
between the results same and the circuit court in which the
case was heard. The Chi-squared test, here, looks at the
chance that particular courts were just as likely to make a
results same decision equally across all bases of decision. It
was found that in all but the First and Third Circuits, judicial
test is not significant, meaning that decisions that relied on
statute, public policy, BIOC, or genetics were all equally likely
to have a result that mirrored the result that would have
occurred had they used intent. Fourth, Table 10 reports results
from a Chi-squared test that examined the relationship
between results same of all circuits and the basis of the
judicial decision. Looking at the Significance Test row, we can
reject the null hypothesis with regards to statute and BIOC
and confidently say that these two bases of judicial decisions
are significantly related to whether the outcome of the case
will be the same as the intent test.

98. Second Circuit–Statute–Results Same Cases from Table 10 (16) / Second
Circuit–Statute Cases from Table 6 (27) = 59.26%.
99. Second Circuit–Results Same Cases from Table 10 (27) / (Total Second Circuit
Cases (56) – Second Circuit–Intent Cases (16) from Table 6 = 67.50%.
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Table 10. Judicial Decision Result Is the Same as the
Intent Test by Location of Court and Basis of
Judicial Decision
Basis of Judicial Decision Is the Same as the Intent Test
Statute

Public
Policy

BIOC

Genetics

Total

N=1
(50.00%)
N = 16
(59.26%)
N=3
(60.00%)
N=4
(80.00%)
N=7
(63.64%)
N=6
(50.00%)
N=5
(62.50%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N = 16
(66.67%)
N=4
(66.67%)
N=3
(60.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N = 65
(60.19%)
2
= 19.54
Pr = 0.05*

N=0
(0.00%)
N=4
(100%)
N=2
(50.00%)
N=1
(100%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=1
(33.33%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=1
(100%)
N=1
(100%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N = 10
(58.82%)
2
= 828
Pr = 0.69

N=5
(83.33%)
N=6
(85.71%)
N=6
(85.71%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=3
(75.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=1
(100%)
N=3
(100%)
N=1
(100%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=1
(100.00%)
N = 26
(78.79%)
2
= 25.59
Pr = 0.00*

N=1
(100%)
N=1
(50.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=1
(100%)
N=1
(100%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=1
(100%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=0
(0.00%)
N=5
(71.43%)
2
= 7.36
Pr = 0.77

N=7
(63.64%)
N = 27
(67.50%)
N = 11
(68.75%)
N=5
(71.43%)
N=7
(63.64%)
N = 11
(55.00%)
N=6
(54.55%)
N=2
(40.00%)
N = 20
(68.97%)
N=6
(66.67%)
N=3
(60.00%)
N=1
(100.00%)
N = 106
(64.24%)

Significance
Test

Circuit
Court
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh
D.C.
Total
Significance
Test

X2 = 15.08
Pr = 0.00*
X2 = 0.93
Pr = 0.82
X2 = 10.97
Pr = 0.01*
X2 = 1.89
Pr = 0.60
X2 = 3.86
Pr = 0.28
X2 = 1.20
Pr = 0.75
X2 = 4.46
Pr = 0.22
X2 = 5.42
Pr = 0.14
X2 = 2.61
Pr = 0.46
X2 = 2.94
Pr = 0.40
X2 = 1.62
Pr = 0.66
X2 = 4.02
Pr = 0.26

Source: Authors’ data and calculations.
Note: * indicates significance at the 0.05 level.
Note: this table excludes cases in which the judge applied the intent test.

V. CONCLUSION
The results of this study confirm that when addressing legal
parentage of ART children, judges have struggled with how best
to make that determination. This is due, in large part, to the lack
of clear and applicable statutes concerning parentage when a
child is conceived via ART. Faced with legislative silence, courts
have developed various approaches for determining legal
parentage, leading to unpredictable and sometimes inequitable
results.
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For over twenty years, legal scholars and judges have argued
about the efficacy of the intent test in determining parentage in
ART cases. This is the first time a study has been conducted to
determine how judges are actually deciding ART cases. In over
100
In
20% of the cases, judges are applying the intent test.
addition, of the remaining cases, regardless of the stated basis on
which the judge made her decision—statute, public policy, BIOC,
or genetics—in seven out of ten cases the outcome is the same as
if the judge had used the intent test.101 These results confirm that
the intent test is a common sense approach to determining
parentage that courts have been using for the past twenty years.
They also indicate that awarding legal parentage to the intended
parents is not inconsistent with the overarching goals of
determining legal parentage. Finally, these results signify that
adopting intent statutes will, in the majority of circumstances,
lead to outcomes that are aligned with how judges are currently
determining parentage in ART cases.

100. See supra Table 1.
101. (Results Same Cases Excluding Traditional Surrogacy from Table 7b (101) +
Total Intent Cases from Table 1 (43)) / (Total Cases from Table 1 (208) – Total Traditional
Surrogacy Cases from Table 2 (14)) = 74.23%.

